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The Construction of Defense Department Contracts in 
Thin Markets1 
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Abstract 
U.S. federal government agencies spend a lot of money through contracts. In Fiscal Year 
2013 federal agencies spent $460 billion on contracts, over one third of all discretionary 
spending.2 Some of these contracts are for simple products, like paper clips or grounds 
maintenance, but other contracts are for far more complex products, like advanced weapon 
systems or program management services. Given the significant amount of money spent on 
federal contracts annually and the importance of some of these contracts for agency 
operation, the way in which contracts are constructed impacts the ability of federal agencies 
to achieve their core missions and functions. This paper examines the impact of product 
characteristics and market conditions on the construction of contracts for products purchased 
by the Department of Defense. Analyses focus on contract type (fixed price versus cost 
reimbursement), contract length, and contract value. 
Introduction 
We draw five years of data (FY 2004–2008) from the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS), the most comprehensive and largely untapped database on federal 
contracting practices, to examine contracts from the Department of Defense (DoD). We 
complement the contract data with data gathered from a survey of federal procurement 
professionals on the characteristics of different products. These data allow us to assess the 
impact of product characteristics and market conditions on contract type, length and value. 
The results indicate that product characteristics and market conditions are predictors of 
contract type, length and value. Fixed price contracts are the norm for simple products, while 
cost reimbursement contracts are often used for complex products. The results are 
inconclusive for contract length, but lower dollar value contracts characterize markets thick 
                                            
 
 
1 Draft—Not for citation without permission of the authors. 
2 See http://www.usaspending.gov. Accessed January 28, 2014. 
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with buyers and sellers, while contract value increases as markets thin with fewer buyers 
and sellers. Finally, as the percentage of an individual contract increases relative to the 
vendor’s total revenues, the length and value of the contract increases. 
Contract Construction—Product Characteristics and Market Characteristics 
Government agencies face an implicit choice when it comes to production. A given 
product3 can either be produced internally, with one’s own resources, or it can be produced 
externally, through a contract with another organization. Contracting can bring with it a 
number of important benefits: efficiencies, cost savings, and innovation top the list (Kelman, 
2002; Savas, 2005). These potential advantages help explain why many governments rely 
extensively on contracting. In the United States, in Fiscal Year 2013, the federal government 
acquired $460 billion of products through contracts, over one third of all discretionary 
spending.4 Contracting also involves risks: cost overruns, delivery delays, and poor quality 
products. These risks can undermine contracting’s ability to contribute to the achievement of 
agency missions and objectives. Harnessing the upside and mitigating the risks of 
contracting is increasingly an essential core management function.5  
One of the primary sources of risk in contracting is the type of product to be acquired 
(Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). Some products, whether they be goods or services, 
are easy to describe and easy to make. That is, it is easy for the purchasing agency to 
describe the exact requirements of the product. This might mean specifying the inputs 
required to make the product (e.g., steel in the case of an aerial refueling tanker), what tasks 
and functions the product will perform (e.g., refueling other planes in the air), the outputs the 
product will generate (e.g., the number of additional gallons of fuel planes will be able to use 
during a flight), or the outcomes that will result from the product (e.g., the extended reach of 
the Air Force’s planes). It is also easy for suppliers to develop the production process to 
create the product. That does not necessarily mean that it is cheap to produce. Some easy-
to-make products—like airplane hangars—require expensive up-front fixed investments. 
Instead, it means that it is easy to figure out how to make the product, and it means that the 
investments required to make it can be relatively easily transferred to some other activity if 
the purchasing government stops buying the product. For example, if the U.S. Air Force 
stops buying airplane hangars, suppliers can retool their production process to make giant 
warehouses or garages for semi-trucks. These products are “simple.”  
“Complex” products, on the other hand, are difficult to describe and difficult to make. 
When government agencies buy a complex product, like an information technology system, 
it is difficult to describe everything the purchasing agency wants the product to do and how it 
should be made. This makes it difficult for the vendor to figure out how to make the product 
and consequently how much it will cost. Complex products often require investments in 
research and development to figure out how to design the production process to make the 
product. These investments are “specialized” to the extent that if the agency stops buying 
                                            
 
 
3 We use the generic term “product” to refer to both goods and services. 
4 See http://www.usaspending.gov. Accessed January 28, 2014. 
5 For example, the 2007 Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
and the United States Congress (https://acquisition.gov/comp/aap/24102_GSA.pdf) finds: “The federal 
acquisition workforce is an essential key to success in achieving the government’s missions. Procurement is an 
increasingly central part of the government’s activities” (p. 352). 
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the product, the supplier has limited alternatives to shop the product (and the accompanying 
production process) to another buyer. On the flip side, if the purchasing agency is 
dissatisfied with the chosen vendor, few if any other suppliers likely have made the required 
specialized investments to produce the product. This leads to what economists refer to as 
“lock in” or “hold up” (Tirole, 1999; Williamson, 1981, 1985). Once a buyer and a seller enter 
into an exchange for a complex product, it is very difficult for them to exit the exchange 
because alternatives are limited. 
In comparison to simple products, the attributes and features of complex products 
create risks. Faced with uncertainty about what is required to make the product and how 
much it will cost, the risk of cost overruns, delivery delays, or an unsatisfactory product is 
high. These risks are lower, although still present, when purchasing simple products in part 
because buyers can turn to the market to replace poor performing sellers with relative ease. 
If a seller provides a product that costs more than the government agency anticipated, or 
delivers it late, or in shoddy condition, the agency is not forced to keep buying the product 
from the same vendor. It can find a vendor that better meets its need in the next round of 
purchasing. Exit is far more challenging when “locked in” to a vendor for a complex product. 
There is a growing literature on managing contracts for complex products in thin 
markets (Amirkhanyan & Lambright, 2010; Girth et al., 2012; Johnston & Girth, 2012). In 
general, this literature focuses on managerial activities that occur after the contract has 
been let, ex post. The primary strategies focus on establishing rules and behavioral patterns 
of interaction that promote cooperation between the buyer and the seller since by entering 
into a contract for a complex product the two parties have essentially entered into an 
interdependent relationship rather than simply an exchange (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 
2013). These management strategies require investments in contract management capacity 
and are worthy of pursuit, but their success is conditioned by the type of contract used to 
govern the relationship (Malatesta & Smith, 2013). 
In an ideal world, external production would be governed by complete contracts. The 
purchaser would specify what he wanted from the vendor in exacting detail. The vendor 
would then provide accurate cost estimates, ultimately yielding a transparent and 
comprehensive agreement of what is to be produced and how much it will cost. Such a 
complete contract would guide both parties to a mutually beneficial outcome. There would 
be no surprises or substantial risk of harm to buyer or seller. But as scholars have long 
argued, human nature makes such complete contracts impossible (Coase, 1937). Because 
buyers and sellers are boundedly rational neither can know with exact certainty what future 
conditions will be like. Factors like the price of key inputs (e.g., steel) or how the product will 
be used in the future will have important implications for whether the buyer and the seller 
each receive value from the exchange, yet the ability of the two parties to forecast these 
types of changes is limited. This lack of knowledge means that parties do not necessarily 
know how to secure their interests ex ante. As a result, contracts often cannot be fully 
specified in advance, and the buyer and the seller will be exposed to risk. For the vendor, 
there is a chance that production costs will exceed what she expected. Profits may be 
reduced or losses incurred as a result. For the buyer, there is concern that the vendor will 
behave opportunistically by lowering service quality or running up charges to increase 
profits. Self-interested parties will—at least some of the time—behave contrary to the 
counterparty’s interests (Williamson, 1981). The costs of writing a contract to cover all these 
contingencies are too high to warrant moving forward with the exchange. Instead, buyers 
and sellers have to rely on incomplete contracts that specify as much as reasonably 
possible about the product, but leave some aspects of the exchange unspecified.  
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Incomplete contracts create a zone of discretion where the decisions and actions of 
the buyer and the seller determine whether both receive value from the exchange. Here the 
best that can be done is to write contractual rules that guide the buyer and the seller 
towards actions that minimize the risks that one or both parties receive losing outcomes. 
One of the principal rules—a key contract design element—that conditions outcomes is the 
method of payment, the contract type. Broadly speaking, contracts come in two types. Fixed 
price contracts specify a final price for the good or service being purchased. This structure 
helps to shield the buyer from risk: Because the purchase price has been set ex ante, the 
vendor must bear any additional costs incurred over the course of production. Fixed price 
contracts therefore create an incentive for the vendor to determine product characteristics 
and costs at the outset. The other principal type of contract is the cost-reimbursement 
contract. Under this arrangement, allowable charges are specified at the outset but a final 
price is not set. A cost-reimbursement contract might state that the vendor can bill the buyer 
for all parts, labor, and fuel used in production. The final price will be a function of these 
factors rather than a fixed figure. This contract type shifts the risk of cost overruns onto the 
buyer because the vendor can pass on unexpected costs. The buyer faces an incentive to 
be as clear as possible about what he wants from the supplier and the means by which it 
should be produced.  
Driven by the insight that fixed price contracts place the risk of cost overruns on the 
vendor, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)—the primary regulations governing 
contracting at the federal level in the United States—promote the use of fixed price contracts 
whenever possible.6 The FAR’s stated preference for fixed price contracts is premised on 
the acquisition of simple products, like commodities, because so much is known about the 
product ex ante and the risk of lock-in is low. Fixed price contracts are not appropriate for 
complex products, though, due to uncertainty about what it will take to produce the product. 
Because the development process for complex products is often iterative, it is challenging to 
identify performance measures for the purchasing agency to monitor over time. In the face 
of such heightened uncertainty we might expect the buyer to insist on a fixed price contract 
to defend against cost escalation. However, setting a payment cap ex ante might impose 
counterproductive constraints on production. The buyer could end up with an inadequate 
product, for example, a mediocre aerial refueling tanker, because the vendor is forced to cut 
corners under the fixed ceiling on costs. Alternatively, the vendor faces the acute risk of 
financial loss. She might not even be willing to enter into the exchange under a fixed price 
regime. In these cases a cost reimbursement contract is preferable. There is clearly still risk 
under this arrangement, but the buyer is now incented to work hard to specify as much as 
possible about what they want from the product and to invest in contract management 
capacity to coordinate and oversee the relationship with the vendor. The FAR allows for the 
use of cost reimbursement contracts in these circumstances. While relying on a fixed price 
contract for a complex product might seem advisable at the outset, it can also result in a 
dysfunctional relationship in which excessive risk is placed on the vendor, almost 
encouraging opportunistic behavior. The astute contract professional follows the FAR’s 
guidance by matching the type of contract and the characteristics of the product to be 
acquired.  
                                            
 
 
6 The FAR is a component of the Code of Federal Regulations, specifically Title 48: Federal Acquisition 
Regulation System. 
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When a buyer and a seller enter into an exchange, they each seek terms that will 
favor their interests. A buyer seeks a product at a price he can afford and a seller seeks 
payment above her costs of production. In some circumstances, the seller may find herself 
in an advantageous position relative to the buyer, for example, if she is the only provider of a 
product the buyer desires. In other cases, it may be the buyer that has the advantage, for 
example, if he is the only purchaser of a product in which there are multiple sellers. We 
make the simple assumption that when the buyer has the advantage he will prefer a fixed 
price contract with a long duration and a high value because he believes it will increase the 
chances of receiving a product at or close to the expected cost. Alternatively, when the 
seller has the advantage she will prefer a longer term cost reimbursement contract because 
it offers a greater opportunity to increase the product’s price in comparison with a fixed price 
contract.7  
In markets thick with sellers, any single buyer has relative freedom to enter into 
exchanges that best suit his or her interests. As markets become thinner, a buyer can 
become increasingly dependent on a single or limited set of providers of the resource they 
seek. Designing a contract in a thin market can mean settling for a contract that is less than 
ideal in order to secure necessary resources.8 Sellers gain prospective bargaining power as 
there are fewer vendors which can offer the product the buyer desires (Bacharach & Lawler 
1984; Root, 1988). The seller’s bargaining power is prospective in the sense that no 
individual seller will actually demand a specific contract type—under federal contract 
practice this determination is made during the pre-award phase—but rather that market 
conditions may cause buyers to select a particular method of payment in the pre-award 
phase, before the Request for Proposal goes out, to ensure that sellers will be willing to bid 
and enter the exchange. As government procurement personnel scan the market in the pre-
award phase, cost reimbursement contracts will be less likely in competitive markets with 
many sellers. In markets with few buyers, prospective sellers find themselves with limited 
alternatives for their products. In these circumstances, a seller may be more likely to bid on 
and enter into a contract where they bear the risk of cost overruns because they are 
dependent on the flow of financial resources (Salancik, 1979). Cost reimbursement 
contracts will be less likely in markets with few buyers than in markets thick with buyers. 
Data and Methods 
To examine the construction of contracts for different types of products we draw data 
from the most comprehensive data set of federal contract actions available to create a 
pooled sample of five years (2004–2008). This approach allows us to measure variables for 
product characteristics and market conditions for different products. We use logistic and 
ordinary least squares regression and accompanying interpretative tools to analyze our 
                                            
 
 
7 Obviously there will be circumstances when a buyer prefers a cost reimbursement contract and a seller a fixed 
cost contract, but all things being equal we assume that buyers are likely to select contract types that keep costs 
low and sellers are likely to select contract types that augment prices. 
8 Resource dependence theory makes powerful arguments about how the power of one organization over 
another in a relationship influences the structure of the relationship (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Provan, 1993). We 
acknowledge this theory’s insights but elect not to draw on it in crafting our framework given that resource 
dependency theory focuses on ongoing interdependent interactions between parties, whereas the contractual 
type decision we examine typically occurs before the exchange occurs and a relationship commenced. In 
instances where contractual exchanges become interdependent resource dependency theory offers a potential 
complement to transaction cost theory (Burt, 1983). 
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data. We conduct follow-on interviews with federal procurement officials to aid in 
interpretation.9  
Research Design 
We examine the contracting decisions of the DoD because it engages in a 
considerable amount of contracting across a broad range of products. Because we are 
interested in how different product characteristics influence contract type decisions, we 
select xx commonly procured product types. The unit of analysis is the initial contract 
agreement.10 
Data 
The data used in this paper are derived from the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS), the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Benchmark Input–Output tables, Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, and a survey of federal contract personnel of our own 
design. The FPDS catalogs all contract actions reported by 66 federal agencies (e.g., 
5,614,758 contract actions were reported in the FPDS in FY 2009). We drew a stratified 
random sample from the FPDS of contracts for 29 product types in the DoD. To create our 
stratified random sample, we created lists for each of the selected the 29 product types of all 
contract actions signed from FY 2004 to FY 2008. Next we randomly drew 100 times from 
each of these lists to create our working sample. As noted earlier, a contract consists of 
either a base contract or a base contract plus modifications. For this reason, we provided 
random numbers only to initial contracts, not to all contract actions in our sample, so that the 
probability of being selected is the same across all contracts in the population. If we had 
provided random numbers to all contract actions on a list, contracts with more modifications 
would have been more likely to be selected.  
The FPDS is the most comprehensive catalog of federal contracting actions 
available. Contract managers from across the federal government are required to input data 
on a standardized form about the contract actions they engage in with each contract they 
oversee. This provides a remarkable window into the contract type decisions of agencies. 
Like all datasets the FPDS has flaws. Most notably, there is no systematic way to monitor 
how contract managers actually input the data; as a result, many records are incomplete. In 
constructing our sample we took care to ensure that we only drew complete, comparable 
records. For this reason, the actual sample size for each service type of 29 services in an 
agency is typically less than 100 in most cases.11  
                                            
 
 
9 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven current and former senior procurement personnel 
across a variety of federal agencies. All of those interviewed had served in a variety of acquisition positions in 
different agencies. Each interview followed the same semi-structured protocol, was recorded by hand, and then 
coded and scanned for key terms. Each interviewee was promised anonymity under a university Institutional 
Review Board process.  
10 Because contract managers can modify contracts through post-award negotiations with vendors, the initial 
contract does not always reflect the contract that ultimately governs the exchange. For this reason, in creating 
our sample we tracked both initial contract decisions and modified contract decisions. While contract managers 
in our sample often changed contract elements, like contract duration, we found no instances in which the type of 
contract—either cost reimbursement or fixed price—was changed after the initial agreement.  
11 The percentage of the incomplete FPDS records is 15.5% (269 of 1,734). The incomplete rate for the DoD is 
15.2%. 
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Dependent Variables 
To measure contract type, we use the contract type on the original base contract 
agreement. Following the FAR, the FPDS identifies 14 different types of contracts based on 
payment method, including five variations on cost reimbursement contracts, six variations on 
fixed price contracts, labor hour contracts, time and materials contracts, and order 
dependent contracts in which the payment method is determined separately for each 
acquisition off of a master contract (FPDS-NG, 2014). We combined all of the cost 
reimbursement contracts into a single cost reimbursement category. We did the same for all 
of the fixed price contracts. Both “time and materials” and “labor hour” contracts are 
variations on traditional cost reimbursement contracts because labor hours can be adjusted 
later if requirements and funding are uncertain. Like cost reimbursement contracts, these 
two contract types provide no positive profit incentive to the vendor for cost control or 
efficiency (GAO 2007, 2009a, 2009b). In addition, the Government Accountability Office 
classifies “order” contracts as partial cost reimbursement contracts, because they each lack 
clarity about the extent of cost reimbursement obligations (GAO 2009c). For these reasons 
we combined “time and materials,” “labor hour,” and “order” contracts into the cost 
reimbursement category. Our first dependent variable, Contract Type, is a dummy variable 
coded “1” for cost reimbursement contract types, and coded “0” for fixed price contract 
types. 
To measure the length of contracts we pull two pieces of data from each FPDS 
record, the initial length of the contract at the time a vendor is selected and the ultimate 
length of the contract the final contract is signed. We label the first measure Initial Contract 
Length and the second measure Ultimate Contract Length. Both variables are measured in 
days. 
To measure the value of contracts we pull two similar pieces of data, the initial value 
of the contract at the time of vendor selection and the ultimate value of the contract at final 
contract signature. We label the first measure Initial Contract Value and the second 
measure Ultimate Contract Length. Both variables are measured in dollars. 
Independent Variables  
To measure product characteristics, we include 29 different product types commonly 
purchased by the DoD. There are two standard classification codes to identify product types: 
North American Industry Classification System codes (NAICS) and Product Service Codes 
(PSC). Because both have different product classification schemes, NAICS and PSC codes 
do not always match for similar products. In our sample, we only looked at products that had 
the same NAICS and PSC codes. This means that there is industry agreement on the 
standardized classification of each of the products in our dataset. An appendix lists the 
NAICS and PSC codes for all 29 products. 
We then conducted an original survey of federal procurement personnel which asked 
respondents to rate each of the 29 products on the two characteristics identified earlier—the 
ease or difficulty of specification and the degree to which specialized investments are 
required to make the product.12 We surveyed members of the National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA), a membership organization of public procurement 
                                            
 
 
12 The survey was conducted with a protocol approved through a university Institutional Review Board. 
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personnel. We advertised the survey through NCMA’s bi-weekly email newsletter, sending 
out a link in two successive email distributions. One hundred and twenty-nine active federal 
procurement personnel provided ratings. The response rate is low—less than 5% of the 
mailing list—but the respondents represent an array of federal procurement personnel with 
varying levels of education and experience. This effort to codify product characteristics at 
the federal level is the first we are aware of to tap the experience of those who do the actual 
purchasing of these types of products.13  
Our measures of product characteristics are derivative of well-established measures 
in the extant literature (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Hefetz & Warner, 2012; Levin & Tadelis, 
2010). We followed the measurement scheme of Brown and Potoski (2005) with some 
important improvements. To assess the ease or difficulty of specifying the product’s 
attributes and requirements, survey respondents were asked to rate each product on a scale 
of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that “requirements definition” was easy and 5 indicating that it was 
difficult. To assess the degree of specialized investments required to produce a product, 
survey respondents were asked to rate each product on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a 
low level of specialized investments and 5 indicating a high level. In order to address 
instrumentation bias, respondents first rated the ease of requirements definition for all 29 
products, followed by a series of questions about federal procurement practice, and then 
rated the degree of specialized investments for each product. The presentation of the 29 
products was also randomized. An appendix reports the wording of the survey prompt for 
each of the two measures. Even with these steps to address instrumentation bias, in 
aggregate respondents rated the products similarly on both dimensions (r2 = .93). To 
address colinearity in the measures, we combined the two scores into a single product 
characteristic score with a potential range from two to ten. This measurement schema aligns 
with our simple versus complex product conceptualization; products with low scores are 
simple and products with high scores are complex. We label this variable Product 
Complexity. 
We measured market conditions in a variety of ways. First we measured whether 
agencies opted to go out for bids or sought a waiver from competitive bidding. The FAR 
permits government agencies to forgo competitive bidding when an agency can 
demonstrate that there is only one source that can satisfy the agency’s requirements, the 
need is urgent, a statute or international agreement provides authorization, or for a series of 
other special purposes (FAR 6.302). This variable provides some insight into whether the 
purchasing government identifies multiple prospective sellers in the market. If the 
purchasing government opts to employ the competition procedure, it presumably anticipates 
receiving multiple bids. We label this dichotomous variable Competition Procedure, coded 
as “1” if the agency went out for competitive bids, else “0.” 
To assess the market power of the DoD, we include a measure of the percentage 
(ranging from 0 to 100) of total sales in each product category that are purchased by the 
DoD. This variable is not as precise as we might like since it measures DoD purchasing in 
aggregate rather than by each of its purchasing units. Still it provides some insight into the 
                                            
 
 
13 We pre-tested the survey instrument on a sample of 38 federal procurement personnel from a different 
professional association, the National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP). The pre-test provided useful 
feedback on ways to improve the validity of the survey items for the constructs we are interested in. 
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concentration of the market on the demand side. This variable is labeled DoD Percentage of 
Sales. 
We draw data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Input/Output Tables to 
measure buyer scarcity; we use the data to calculate the total number of industries that 
purchase the product. A lower number of industries that purchase the product represents a 
scarcity of buyers and suggests that the purchasing agency will have a position of 
advantage in the market. We label this continuous variable as Number of Purchasing 
Industries.14  
To assess market concentration on the seller side, we include a variable that 
measures when a single supplier provides the product for the DoD. This could be the result 
of the DoD opting to not use the competition procedure or when only one bid comes in when 
the DoD goes out for bids. We label this dichotomous variable Single Supplier, coded “1” if 
there is only one vendor, else “0.” 
Finally, to assess the value of the contract to the selected firm, we use Dun and 
Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database to construct a variable that measures the value in 
dollars of the contract over the total revenues in dollars for the firm in the year the contract 
was awarded. This variable is labeled contract revenue/total revenue. 
Control Variables 
We include a variety of control variables in our analyses. First, we include dummy 
variables for each of the five years of data in our sample, coded “1” for each year, else “0.” 
In our empirical analysis, we use FY 2004 as the base year. Second, for our contract length 
analyses we include contract type as a control. Finally, for our contract value analyses we 
use include contract type and contract length as controls. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the all the dependent, independent and 
control variables in our analyses. 
                                            
 
 
14 In separate analyses we also include a variety of ex post measures of market competitiveness and 
concentration. These variables include the following: the total number of bids, whether there was a single offeror 
when agencies went out for competitive bids, and the percentage of the vendor’s total revenue for a given year 
represented by the contract (this last measure is drawn from Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database). 
None of these measures are statistically significant or influence the results for the variables described above. We 
suspect that this is because all of these variables measure information revealed after contract type is set. 
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 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Contract Type (1 = CR) 
 
Initial Contract Length (days) 
 
Ultimate Contract Length (days) 
 
Initial Contract Value ($) 
 








# of Purchasing Industries 
 
DoD % of Sales 
 

































































































































































This section reports the results of our empirical analyses. The results provide 
evidence suggesting that product characteristics and market conditions are important 
predictors of contract type, length and value. At this early stage of inquiry, the results are 
preliminary. Our empirical strategy is to first examine simple Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions to determine whether relationships are present in the expected direction. Future 
analyses will employ more sophisticated analytical tools (e.g., logistic regression for the 
contract type analysis and censored regression for the contract length and value analyses) 
and interpret the effect size of independent variables. 
Several of our key independent variables are correlated, namely product complexity 
and DoD % of sales. Consequently, we run three models for our contract type analysis: one 
model with the full slate of independent and control variables and two additional models 
which exclude each collinear variable. Table 2 reports the results of our contract type 
analysis. 
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 Regression Results of Impact of Independent Variables on Contract 
Type, 2004–2008 
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Note. *P < .10; **P < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 
The coefficient for product complexity is statistically significant and positive in both 
models A and B, suggesting that cost reimbursement contracts are more likely as product 
complexity increases. The coefficient for competition procedure is significant and positive in 
model A, but not significant in the other two models. The coefficient for DoD % of sales is 
significant and positive in model C suggesting that as the DoD purchases a larger share of a 
particular product type the likelihood of a cost reimbursement contract increases. The 
coefficient for # of purchasing industries is significant and positive in all three models, but 
the effect size appears very small. Taken together the results suggest that the primary 
predictor of contract type is product complexity. This is not surprising given that the FAR 
guides agencies to make contract type decision ex ante when the product is known but 
market conditions are unclear. 
Table 3 reports the results of our contract length analyses. Because of collinearity 
between product complexity and DoD % of sales we follow the same strategy of running 
three separate models. In each model, the left column reports the results for initial contract 
length and the right column reports the results for ultimate contract length. The coefficients 
for product complexity are statistically significant in both models A and B, but the signs flip. 
At this preliminary stage, these results are inconclusive. The coefficients for competition 
procedure are statistically significant and positive in all three models. Somewhat counter 
intuitively, when agencies opt to use the competition procedure, the result is longer 
contracts. It may be that when agencies forgo competition they are typically buying a 
product they can acquire quickly to meet their needs. On the supply side, the results are 
mixed. The coefficients for DoD % of sales and # of purchasing industries are statistically 
significant and positive in all three models. None of the coefficients for single supplier are 
statistically significant and the signs are inconsistent. As the DoD’s share of the market 
increases, contract length increases. This may be because the types of products for which 
the DoD is the dominant purchaser tend to be highly complex (e.g., advanced weapon 
systems). The positive sign for the product complexity coefficient in model B supports this 
interpretation. The coefficient for contract revenues/total revenues is positive in all three 
models but only significant in ultimate contract length analyses. It may be that vendors that 
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are highly reliant on a single contract for their livelihood negotiate for longer contracts than 
initially anticipated. Finally, the control variable contract type is positive and significant 
suggesting cost reimbursement contracts are longer than fixed price contracts. 
 Regression Results of Impact of Independent Variables on Contract 
Length, 2004–2008 
    Model A     Model B     Model C 
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Note. *P < .10; **P < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 
Table 4 reports the results of our contract value analyses. Because of collinearity 
between product complexity and DoD % of sales we follow the same strategy of running 
three separate models. In each model, the left column reports the results for initial contract 
value and the right column reports the results for ultimate contract value. The coefficients for 
product complexity are only statistically significant in model B, when DoD % of sales is 
excluded. This suggests that high dollar contracts are associated with the acquisition of 
complex products. The coefficients for competition procedure are statistically significant and 
negative in all three models. When agencies opt not to use the competition procedure, the 
result is higher dollar contracts. This provides some evidence that competition leads to lower 
cost contracts. On the supply side the coefficients for DoD % of sales are statistically 
significant and positive in both models A and C. This suggests that increases in DoD market 
share are associated with higher dollar contracts. Again, this may be a reflection of the type 
of products the DoD tends to buy rather than a reflection of market power. The coefficients 
for # of purchasing industries are statistically significant and negative in all three models. 
This suggests that as markets thick with sellers are associated with lower dollar contracts. 
All of the coefficients for single supplier are statistically significant and positive suggesting 
that sole source contracts have high dollar values. The coefficient for contract revenues/total 
revenues is positive and significant in all three models suggesting that as vendors become 
highly reliant on a single contract they negotiate high value contracts. Finally, the control 
variable contract length is positive and significant suggesting longer contracts tend to be 
high dollar contracts. 
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 Regression Results of Impact of Independent Variables on Contract 
Value, 2004–2008 
    Model A     Model B     Model C 
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Note. *P < .10; **P < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 
Conclusion 
Taken together the results of our analyses provide evidence that product 
characteristics and market conditions are predictors of contract type, length and value. Fixed 
price contracts are the norm for simple products, while cost reimbursement contracts are 
often used for complex products. While the evidence is inconclusive for contract length, 
lower dollar value contracts characterize markets thick with buyers and sellers, while 
contract value increases as markets thin with fewer buyers and sellers. Finally, as the 
percentage of an individual contract increases relative to the vendor’s total revenues, the 
length and value of the contract increases. These results are preliminary and invite more 
sophisticated analyses and interpretation.  
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Appendix A: NAICS and PSC Categorizations for 29 Products 
Service NAICS PSC Service NAICS PSC 
Advertising 541810 R701 Solid Waste Collection 562111 S205 
Auditing 541211 R704 Warehousing and Storage 493110 S215 
Computer Sys Development 541512 D302 Defense Aircraft – Basic Research 541710 AC11 
Court Reporting 561492 R606 Defense Aircraft – Applied R&D 541710 AC12 





Janitorial Service 561720 S201 Defense Aircraft – Engineering Dev. 541330 AC14 
Landscaping 561730 S208 Weapons – Basic Research 541710 AC51 
Laundry and Dry-Cleaning 812320 S209 Weapons – Applied R&D 541710 AC52 




Logistics Support 541614 R706 Guns (30MM and Less) 332994 1005 
Equipment Maintenance/Repair 811310 J099 Bombs 332993 1325 
Professional and Mgmt Training  611430 U008 Guided Missiles 336414 1410 
Program Management/Support 541611 R408 Aircraft, Fixed Wing 336411 1510 
Program Review/Development 541611 R409 Submarines 336611 1904 
Security Guard and Patrol 561612 S206    
Appendix B: Survey Prompts 
Requirements Definition 
Requirements definition involves specifying and describing the attributes and 
performance expectations of a good or service to be acquired.  
At one end of the scale, a good or service has requirements that are EASY TO 
DEFINE if it is relatively straightforward to specify and describe the attributes and 
performance expectations of the good or service. For easy to define services, procurement 
professionals CAN easily write a contract that clearly specifies the good or service the 
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vendor should provide and performance metrics for assessing the quality of the good or 
service.  
At the other end of the scale, a good or service has requirements that are 
DIFFICULT TO DEFINE if it is relatively hard to specify and describe the attributes and 
performance expectations of the good or service. For difficult to define services, 
procurement professionals CANNOT easily write a contract that clearly specifies the good or 
service the vendor should provide and performance metrics for assessing the quality of the 
good or service. 
Degree of Specialized Investment 
Degree of specialized investments refers to whether specialized investments are 
required to produce the good or service. Specialized investments apply to the production of 
one good or service but are very difficult to adapt for the production of other goods or 
services. These specialized investments include:  
 the use of a specific a location that is only movable at a great cost;  
 the use of highly specialized human skills that cannot be put to work for other 
purposes; 
 the use of specialized tools or a complex system designed for a single 
purpose; or 
 the requirement that the service reach the user within a relatively limited 
period of time or the quality of the service greatly diminishes. 
At one end of the scale, a good or service requires a LOW DEGREE OF 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS if no specialized investments are generally required to 
produce the good or service. An example of a good or service with a low degree of 
specialized investments is the production of simple writing pens. As a basic assembly line 
product needing few raw materials, pens can be produced in a diversity of locations, with 
few investments in either physical or human assets, and can be used effectively many years 
after they are produced. If the purchasing government finds that the pens it purchases do 
not meet its needs, then it can easily find another vendor. 
At the other end of the scale, a good or service has a HIGH DEGREE OF 
SPECIALIZED INVESTMENTS if many specialized investments are generally required to 
produce the good or service. Such specific investments often mean that if a government 
decides to purchase such a good or service, it is more likely that only the selected vendor 
will be available in future rounds of contracting. An example of a good or service with a high 
degree of specialized investments is the production of flu vaccines. Producing flu vaccines 
requires a substantial investment in scientific research (a highly specialized human skill) and 
specialized laboratories and equipment. If the purchasing government finds that the flu 
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Appendix C: Ease of Measurement and Specialized Investment Ratings 
Product Category Ease of Measurement Specialized Investment Combined 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean 
Trash/Garbage Collection Services 1.73 1.02 84 1.35 0.61 71 3.08 
Landscaping/Grounds Keeping 
Services 1.81 0.97 85 1.35 0.70 72 3.16 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Services 1.81 1.04 80 1.45 0.71 71 3.26 
Custodial Janitorial Services 1.97 1.07 87 1.33 0.65 72 3.30 
Court Reporting Services 1.92 0.90 75 1.59 0.93 68 3.51 
Warehousing and Storage Services 1.92 0.95 83 1.70 0.88 69 3.61 
Guard Services 2.27 1.06 86 1.51 0.88 71 3.77 
Advertising Services 2.66 1.14 79 1.77 0.78 70 4.43 
Auditing Services 2.73 1.00 85 2.04 0.96 71 4.77 
Legal Services 2.87 1.21 79 2.10 1.10 71 4.97 
Training/Curriculum Development 2.87 1.13 90 2.15 0.94 73 5.02 
Maintenance and Equipment Repair 2.74 1.09 87 2.49 1.05 72 5.22 
Program Management/Support 
Services 3.15 1.12 93 2.47 1.08 75 5.62 
Logistics Support Services 3.01 1.07 82 2.62 1.09 71 5.63 
Program Review/Development Service 3.41 1.14 87 2.46 1.10 70 5.87 
Guns (30MM and less) 2.61 1.22 64 3.28 1.31 57 5.89 
Engineering and Technical Services 3.77 1.11 88 2.99 1.18 71 6.76 
Bombs 3.34 1.31 58 4.04 1.09 53 7.38 
Systems Development Services 4.12 1.15 75 3.46 1.21 65 7.58 
Weapons – Basic Research 3.88 1.23 67 3.72 1.11 57 7.60 
Defense Aircraft – Basic Research  3.89 1.28 63 4.05 1.07 58 7.94 
Aircraft, Fixed Wing 3.79 1.36 62 4.29 0.97 56 8.08 
Defense Aircraft – Engineering Dev. 4.13 1.13 63 4.33 0.83 57 8.46 
Weapons – Applied R&D 4.13 1.18 63 4.47 0.72 55 8.60 
Defense Aircraft – Applied R&D 4.18 1.20 60 4.47 0.79 55 8.66 
Guided Missiles 4.10 1.22 62 4.62 0.63 52 8.71 
Weapons – Advanced Dev. 4.29 1.11 63 4.59 0.60 54 8.88 
Defense Aircraft – Advanced Dev. 4.37 1.07 62 4.64 0.59 55 9.01 
Submarines 4.21 1.21 57 4.80 0.56 55 9.01 
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